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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
MARY VATSIS, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8989 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The V & H Motor Company was an automobile dealer-
ship doing business in Price, Utah. The appellant, Mrs. 
Mary Vatsis, was office manager for the V & H Motor Com-
pany and handled its books and records (T. 163). She con-
sidered herself to be a part of the company for she refers 
to the records as "my books" (T. 159). Mrs. Vatsis testi-
fied that she sold cars for V & H Motor Company (T. 154) 
and her entire testimony was to the effect that she made 
the contracts and handled the financial affairs for the V 
& H Motor Company. 
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The dealership had an operating arrangement with 
Commercial Credit Corporation, whose district office was 
in Provo, Utah, for the purchasing of conditional sales con-
tracts for the financing of automobiles sold. It is customary 
in financing automobiles that the contract is sold to the 
finance company before the title is furnished to the finance 
company because it takes some time for the title to be re-
turned from the State Tax Commission. The fact is that 
at the time they sell the contract they forward to the Tax 
Commission the title for change of registration, showing 
the new owner and lienholder. During the period involved 
in this case the V & H Motor Company through Mary Vatsis 
( T. 154) presented and sold to the Commercial Credit Cor-
poration a contract dated March 9, 1957, purportedly bear-
ing the signature of one Ann Troulis covering a blue colored 
1956 Buick automobile, Serial No. 6-C2018583. The appel-
lant knew that it was a false and fraudulent contract for 
she drew it up and signed the name of Ann Troulis and 
submitted it to Commercial Credit Corporation when in 
fact the car had not been sold to Ann Troulis. The Credit 
Company, in relying on the representations of the appellant, 
bought the contract and under check dated March 12, 1957, 
paid V & H Motor Company $2,175.00, which was received 
and deposited by Mary Vatsis to the account of the dealer-
ship (T. 148). This same car was later sold, on April 26, 
1957, to Chris Bolotos, who paid cash for the car (T. 164) 
and title to the car was transferred to 1\:'[r. Bolotos. After 
selling the car to Mr. Bolotos, Mary Vatsis knowingly and 
on behalf of the V & H Motor Company, made three pay-
ments on the said car to Commercial Credit, (T. 158), 
thereby continuing the fraudulent transaction. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NUMBER 3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
Point I and Point II of appellant's brief are based 
upon the same premise, that a forgery had to be shown in 
order to prove the appellant guilty of any crime. 
We wish to call the Court's attention to the fact that 
this case did not go to trial on information (R. 15) but in 
fact went to trial on amended information (R. 57). This 
amended information was filed and allowed by the Court 
prior to trial and reads as follows : 
"Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District At-
torney for the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Utah and accuses Tl/.[ary Vatsis and John Vatsis, 
they having been duly bound over to answer this 
charge by a committing magistrate, and charges that 
the said Mary Vats is and John Vatsis, on or about 
the 12th day of March, 1957, at Utah County, State 
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of Utah, did commit the crime of a felony, to-wit: 
Obtaining money under false pretenses, committed 
as follows, to-wit: That they, the said Mary Vatsis 
and John Vatsis, at the time and place aforesaid, did 
wilfully, intentionally and feloniously obtain a check 
in the amount of $6, 700.00, which check was paid 
from the funds of the Commercial Credit Corpora-
tion, a corporation, by the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company. This check was obtained by the defen-
dants by representing and selling to the said Com-
mercial Credit Corporation for the sum of $2,175.00, 
which sum was paid out of the aforementioned check, 
a fraudulent Conditional Sales Contract dated March 
9, 1957, and purported to be entered into by and 
between Ann Troulis and V & H Motor Company, 
which Conditional Sales Contract was fraudulent 
and forged ; the said Mary Vatsis and John Vatsis 
well knowing that the said Conditional Sales Con-
tract was fraudulent, forged and of no value." 
The interesting point about this information is that the gist 
of the information is that the appellant did obtain money 
under false p,retenses by "* * * representing and sell-
ing to the said Commercial Credit Corporation for the sum 
of $2,175.00, which sum was paid out of the aforementioned 
check, a fraudulent contract dated March 9, 1957." (Em-
phasis added.) The gravamen of the offense is that it was 
a fraudulent sales contract. The fact that the information 
further down says "that the said Conditional Sales Contract 
was fraudulent, forged and of no value" is mere surplusage. 
This is not binding upon the State nor does it restrict the 
proof. The answer to this argument also answers counsel's 
contention in Point II in respect to this particular point. 
We quote to the Court the following statutes as authority 
for this position: 
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"Any allegation unnecessary under the existing 
law or under the provisions of this chapter, may, if 
contained in an information, indictment or bill of 
particulars, be disregarded; as surplusage." 
(77-21-42, U. C. A. 1953.) 
The case in point on this is Ballaine v. District Court of the 
First Jud'icial District for Box Elder County, 107 Utah 247, 
153 P. 2d 265, which cites the above statute and holds sur-
plusage in information charged in a crime of obtaining 
money and property under false pretenses does not vitiate 
the essential elements in defense being set forth in the 
pleading. The law is well settled on this question of sur-
plusage for the courts have repeatedly held as long as the 
essential elements are present, the remainder is regarded 
as surplusage. Especially is this true under Section 77-21-
47, U. C. A. 1953, which sets forth the short form of plead-
ings. 
In the case of State v. Schow, 125 P. 2d 955, in citing 
Section 77-21-42, the court stated: 
~eThe repugnant allegations shall not invalidate 
an information and that unnecessary allegations may 
be treated as surplusage." 
State v. Robbins, 127 P. 2d 1042; State v. Burke, 129 P. 2d 
560. 
We respectfully state to the court the essential elements 
of the complaint have been set forth in the pleading. We 
cite to the Court the statute concerning obtaining money 
under false pretenses : 
"Every person who knowingly and designedly, 
by false or fraudulent representations or pretenses, 
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obtains from any other person any chose in action, 
money, goods, wares, chattels, effects or other valu-
able thing, with intent to cheat or defraud any per-
son of the same, if the value of the property so ob-
tained does not exceed $50.00, is punishable as in 
cases of petit larceny, and when the property so ob-
tained is of the value of more than $50.00, the per-
son so offending is punishable as in cases of grand 
larceny.'' 
(76-20-8, U. C. A. 1953.) 
The gist of the statute is that moneys must be obtained 
by false and fraudulent representations or pretenses. That 
is what the State charged the appellant with and that is 
what the jury found her guilty of. The word "forgery'' is 
nothing more than surplusage, and is not necessary to be 
proved if the contract itself was false and fraudulent and 
the jury had sufficient evidence to find such fact to be true. 
Regardless of whether the information required the 
State to prove that the contract was forged, th__gre js suffi-
cient evidence for the jury to conclude that it was. In argu-
-----~~~;_----~~--~~~~-ing this point the State does not concede a forgery was, in 
fact, an element of obtaining money under false pretenses, 
it being the State's position that the pretense was that this 
is a valid contract, when in fact it was false and fraudulent. 
It was fraudulent for a number of reasons besides the ques-
tion of signature, ,Eowever, the tes_!!mony ot.~ ___ r_r'Nllllli 
was sufficient for the jury to co~~1Yd_El..f9rgery . 
. - "-~-·--.. --~~~" ···~·····-~--"' . --·· ~-~········-----~·--·-. .... __ , ___ ~·-----~·· . --......___.._--
Ann Troulis was a very evasive, equivocable witness. 
She had admittedly testified in two different ways concern-
ing the contract. Her testimony at the preliminary hearing, 
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part of which was admitted into evidence, was that she had 
positively not authorized the signature, nor had she pur-
chased the car (Tr. 60). Her testimony in respect to au-
thorization was completely unbelievable and the only con-
clusion that the jury could come to was the contract was, 
in fact, forged. Rather than set out the entire transcript 
of testimony in this brief, we cite to the Court the Troulis 
testimony from Tr. 54 to Tr. 70. 
The Troulis testimony itself is sufficient to show for-
gery, however, when connected with the testimony of Mr. 
Allen and Mr. Frandsen as to what Mary Vatsis haq...,said_ to 
,..r'"". ··-.~.._.,_ 
them, it would appear to make it conclusive( Mr. Allen ·· 
~
testified that Mary Vatsis told him that she had sold cars 
to Lee Allred and Spiros Aganis and then signed their names 
...... .,.... ... -, ... __ .. ,-
to separate contracts and sold the cantracts...:tG-Co.~ ..,.... __ ___ 
Cr.~diiJ!nd received money from the Finance Company in 
payment for the contracts when act.nally_the cars had be_~n 
~--ea-sh- These two contracts indicated her intent to 
defraud and corroborating of forgery (Tr. 180-181). Mr. 
Allen (Tr. 182) also testified that there were other con-
----.... -,----·-·-----~---·-······ ........... ,, ..... -~ 
tracts of the same nature that she had admitted to him were 
fo;g~d~~;;d· fraudul~~t:· .This t~;i;;;-~y-.. is corroborated ·by 
tl~;-·t~;ti;:~~y-~f'--Mi:: Frandsen (Tr. 118). Mr. Frandsen 
testified (Tr. 118 to 120) that Mary Vatsis placed th~-Ann 
Troulis contract in a category with other contracts, which 
she stated she had attached the signatures to, sold to Com-
mercial Credit and received money for. These were con-
tracts where there weren't customers, or the cars were not 
in the possession of customers, or cars hadn't been reg-
istered, or there had not been any documents submitted 
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to the State for registration. Mr. Frandsen then testified 
that she proceeded to tell him (Tr. 120) how these con-
tracts, which included the Troulis contract, were sold to 
Commercial Credit and how she operated the V & H Motor 
Company (Tr. 120, Line 2 through Line 20): 
"She said she would take these contracts into 
the office in Provo and submit the contracts to the 
employees at that office and they would write a 
check to her and she would also write them a check 
to pay off other contracts, and one week she would 
write a check for $5,000.00, the next week, why she 
would have to write a check for $6,000.00 to take care 
of contracts submitted the week before, until it got 
so that all they were doing was exchanging checks, 
the V & H Motor Company and the branch office of 
Commercial Credit in Provo. She also said that it 
was through this transaction that she was losing 
money, that the contracts that were submitted the 
week before would be forgotten about and there 
would be more important business come up, and it 
got so that she was up on a balloon and she asked 
to get off of this balloon and nobody seemed to be 
able to help her clear this matter up." 
From this evidence the jury had ample reason to conclude 
that the Troulis contract was a forgery. 
The appellant has made great to-do about a variance 
contained in the inforn1ation and the Bill of Particulars. 
In order to understand the answer to the bill of particulars 
it is necessary to set forth both the questions and the 
answers, which the appellant has failed to do. We refer 
the Court to the questions (R. 16) and the answers (R. 20). 
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The appellant has argued to the Court that the information 
is limited by the bill of particulars. 
We refer the Court to the case of State v. Dabb, 84 S. 
2d 601, wherein the Court stated: 
"Irrespective of what may be contained or set 
forth in the bill of particulars relied on by the defen-
dant to support his contention presented by these 
bills, we are not concerned therewith. The prosecu-
tion was conducted exclusively on what was con-
tained within the four corners of the bill of infor-
mation, and we cannot look beyond its four corners 
to determine its validity. There can be no prosecu-
tion on a bill of particulars. Nor can the contents 
of a bill of particulars, whatsoever is set forth there-
in, alter, change, amend or affect the bill of infor-
mation. A bill of particulars can neither create a 
defect in a bill of information nor remedy a defec-
tive one. * * *" 
See also State v. Varnado, 23 S. 2d 106, 126; State v. Mc-
Queen, 87 S. 2d 727; Hevener v. Commonwealth, 54 S. E. 
2d 893; 27 Am. J ur., Indictments and Informations, Sec. 
112. 
We state that the Bill of Particulars does not do any 
more than answer the questions submitted by the appellant 
and was never intended to be more than that. Question 3 
in the Bill of Particulars has been fully and completely 
answered and does not, in effect, say that the appellant did 
not submit to the Commercial Credit Corporation the fraud-
ulent contract. Nor can it be implied from the language 
that she did not. We cite to the Court 77-21-43: 
"(2) No variance between those allegations of 
an information, indictment or bill of particulars, 
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which state the particulars. of the offense, whether 
amended or not, and the evidence offered in support 
thereof shall be ground for the acquittal of the de-
fendant. The court may at any time cause the in-
formation, indictment or bill of particulars to be 
amended in respect to any such variance, to conform 
to the evidence." 
" ( 3) If the court is of the opinion that the 
defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon 
the merits by any such defect, imperfection or omis-
sion or by any such variance the court may because 
of such defect, imperfection, omission or variance, 
unless the defendant objects, postpone the trial, to 
be had before the same or another jury on such terms 
as the court considers proper. In determining 
whether the defendant has been prejudiced in his 
defense upon the merits, the court shall consider 
all the circumstances of the case and the entire course 
of the prosecution." 
"(4) No appeal, or motion made after verdict, 
based on any such defect, imperfection, omission, or 
variance shall be sustained unless it is affirmatively 
shown that the defendant was in fact prejudiced 
thereby in his defense upon the merits." 
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the de-
fendant raised no objection to the limitation, if there was 
such a limitation, in the Bill of Particulars. If it is her 
contention that forgery had to be shown, she has not to this 
date ever moved the Court for a postponement based or 
premised on the defendant not being informed as to what 
she was charged with. 
In the case of Hevener v. Commonwealth, supra, the 
appellant on appeal contended that there was a variance in 
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the indictment and the bill of particulars as to whether the 
charge was first or second degree murder. The court stated: 
"The accused would have us say that the first 
degree murder charge in the indictment was nulli-
fied by reason of the bill of particulars. He was not 
to be tried upon the bill of particulars, but only upon 
the indictment. The two instruments were to be 
read together. 
"* * * 
"He also sat by and heard evidence going to the 
jury which tended to support a charge of murder in 
the first degree without objecting. If he thought at 
that time that the charge of murder in the first 
degree had been eliminated and that he would be 
tried for no higher offense than second degree mur-
der, he should have objected to that evidence. If he 
had done so and there had been merit in his objec-
tion, it is quite likely the court would have permitted 
an enlarging amendment to the bill of particulars 
if it were insufficient, making it conform to the 
evidence. * * *" 
If the appellant was dissatisfied with the Bill of Par-
ticulars and if the Bill of Particulars and information did 
not set forth a crime, then the appellant had a remedy by 
filing a motion to quash the information as set forth in 
Section 77-21-10. When a crime is charged and the appel-
lant fully apprised of the facts does not avail herself of the 
remedies supplied by law, she cannot, at this late date, be 
heard to complain. State v. Russell, 145 P. 2d 1003. 
If the appellant's contention were correct, it would be 
necessary for the State of Utah in every case to plead evi-
dentiary facts and those facts not pleaded could not be 
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proved. This would be an unreasonable burden to place 
upon the State. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NUMBER 3. 
The appellant takes objection to Instruction No.3 and 
particularly to the use of the words "fictitious" and "bona 
fide." Its brief proceeds to limit the word "fictitious" by 
a criminal definition for fictitious check. Fictitious has an 
ordinary connotation which is intended in ths case. The 
Court was not instructing the jury in respect to a fictitious 
check but was using the word "fictitious" in a normal, 
grammatical sense. "Fictitious" is defined in Webster's 
Dictionary as follows : 
"Feigned ; imaginary ; not genuine, like fiction." 
It must be presumed that the jury was of normal intelli-
gence. This is not an unusual or strange word, but is a com-
mon word used by laymen and people of ordinary intelli-
gence. It properly describes the contract because it was, 
in fact, not genuine. What could be a better adjective than 
"fictitious?" 
"Bona fide" is in the nature of the same type of word. 
This is a word that has a common connotation, understood 
by the ordinary man on the street as meaning genuine. 
There is no reason to suppose that the jury did not under-
stand what "bona fide" meant. The term was even used 
by the appellant's attorney in the examination of a witness 
(Tr. 33). The ve:ry language of the paragraph in the in-
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struction is sufficient to show the meaning of "bona fide" 
but even if the word were left out the meaning would be 
clear. "Bona fide" is not essential for the clarity of the 
paragraph, consequently, this argument is not sound. 
The Court, in giving Instruction No. 3, realized that 
forgery was not an element of the crime of obtaining money 
by false pretense. The instruction was that if the jury found 
that Mary Vatsis presented a fictitious contract that did 
not represent a bona fide sale of an automobile, and Mary 
Vatsis knew it, then the jury should find her guilty. The 
State, as set forth in the record and as outlined in the fore-
going part of this brief, certainly brought forth evidence 
proving this instruction. 
The appellant, on pages 11 and 14 of her brief, relies a 
great deal on the contention that if it were not a forgery 
then the Commercial Credit Corporation was not injured 
because it would be a binding contract against Ann Troulis. 
The appellant is avoiding the fact that Commercial Credit 
bought the contract relying on the representation of Mary 
Vatsis that it was a valid contract and that the signature 
attached thereto was the signature of Ann Troulis, when, 
in fact, it was not her signature and no evidence was brought 
forward to dispute this point. The fact of the matter is 
that Commercial Credit was not interested in buying a law-
suit to prove if Ann Troulis signed the contract or if she 
gave Mary Vatsis the right to sign her name, but was 
interested in buying a contract signed by Ann Troulis for 
the financing of an automobile. Even in trying to deny that 
she didn't give the appellant the right to sign her name, 
Mrs. Troulis never, at anytime, said that she bought the car 
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or gave the appellant the right to sign her name. We are 
sure the court can see the lawsuit that this would involve 
and the difficulty of proving the contract. 
As the record shows, Ann Troulis changed her testi-
mony from that given at the preliminary hearing but she 
changed it from definitely not giving the appellant the right 
to sign her name to "I don't remember". She indicated that 
she did not buy the car and would not accept the responsi-
bility of the contract. She even stated that the reason she 
testified at the preliminary hearing that she did not give 
the appellant the right to sign her name was because she 
was afraid they would force her to buy a car that she could 
not afford. On page 62 of the transcript, she testified: 
"Q. Did you ever buy any other car from her? 
"A. No. I mean, I was planning on buying 
one." 
This affirms the fact that she did not buy a car and was 
not intending to be bound by the contract signed by the 
appellant. Commercial Credit did not receive what they 
bargained for, so even if Ann Troulis decided to accept the 
contract at a later date, it would still not take the appellant 
off the hook, for in the case of State v. Caspm·son (Appeal 
of Snyder), 71 Utah 68, 262 Pac. 294, the court said: 
"That a pretense false in fact and an actual fraud 
resulting in prejudice are essential elements of the 
crime in question, and must be proved to establish 
guilt, are general principles of law which we rec-
ognize and approve. The actual fraud and prejudice 
required, however, is determined according to the 
situaHon of the victim in1mediately after he parts 
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with his property. If he gets what was pretended 
and what he bargained for, there is no fraud or 
prejudice. But if he then stands without the right 
or thing it was pretended he would then have, he has 
been defrauded and prejudiced by reason of the false 
pretense, and the offense is complete, notwithstand-
ing thereafter he may regain his property, or the 
person obtaining it or another compensates him, or 
he thereafter obtains full redress in some manner 
not contemplated when he parted with his property." 
This was affirmed in the case of State v. Fisher, 8 P. 2d, p. 
589. This would indicate that if it were a fictitious contract 
that did not represent a bona fide sale of the automobile 
and Mary Vatsis was aware of it, then it would amount to 
obtaining money by false pretense even if at a later date 
Commercial Credit recouped its loss. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that there was sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the verdict of the jury and that the Court's 
instruction was not erroneous. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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